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STUDY OBJECTIVES:
Determine the range of reliability figures of merit required for
successful NEP manned Mars mission.
Provide design insights:
• design achievability, given existing technology;
• alternative design approaches or concepts to enhance
reliability, crew safety;
• allocation of research and development resources•
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The objective of this study was to establish the initial quantitative reliability bounds for
nuclear electric propulsion sysmms in a manned Mars mission required to ensure crew
safety and mission success. F'mding the reliability bounds involves balancing top-down
(mission driven) requLr_mentsand bottom-up (technology driven) capabilities. In seeking
this balance we hope to: (I) provide design insights into the aehicvability of the baseline
design in _rns of reliability x_quirements, given the existing technology base; (2) suggest
alternative design approaches which might enhance reliability and crew safety;, and (3)
indicate what technology areas require significant research and development to achieve the
reliability objectives.
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STUDY OVERVIEW
This study was broken down into three broad areas: the processing of programmatic
inputs; performing the mission operability analysis; and analyzing the trade space for
design insights. The processing of programnmtic inputs began with identifying,
soliciting, obtaining, and processing the required program unique inputs. These included
the basic NEP system design, the top-level mission and crew safety success criteria, and
the mission profile. Next, the existing technology base was examined to identify and
obtain data on the historical performance of NEP and NEP-related (surrogate)
components, and to determine the set of diagnostic tools appropriate to this analysis.
The mission operability analysis consisted of problem definition and implementation
of the selected analysis approach. Problem definition included characterizing the design in
terms appropriateto the selected diagnostic tools, and defining the reliability requirement
drivers in the NEP system for the selected mission. Implementation of the approach
consisted of developing the input for the various diagnostic tools, and analyzing the
reliability trade space developed by the tools. The process of trade space insight
development included analyzing the trade space output and seeking design insights by
looking for improvements in system reliability when the basic design is altered, or
optimization through perturbations.
g
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CONCEPT OF ACHIEVABILITY
• Achievability: The ratio of required performance to achieve
performance.
• Measures how far a design has to go.
• Achievability Index = 1: Design is achieved•
• Achievability Index = 0: Design cannot be achieved
with existing technology.
Incorporates uncertainties in:
Particulars of design,
Relevance of historical performance.
• Should therefore be presented as a range of values.
A core concept m this analysis is the idea of achievability -- how well the existing
technology base will support the NEP mission and design as given. Achievability is
formally the ratio of the required performance to the readily achieved performance, given
thcstateofthetechnologybase.Sincethereareuncertaintiesnbothtlmparticularsofthe
design,andintherelevanceofhistoricalperformancetoNEP -MannedMarsMission
performance;andsincethereissignificantvariabilitynthemeasuredperformanceof
historical(surrogate)clcmcnts,theachicvabilityshouldbcpresentedasarangeofvalues.
Due to time and funding limitations on this study, a rigorous development of the
distribution of achiovability values is not presented. Instead, point values of the limits on
achicvability arc found.
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ACHIEVABILITY DEFINITION
(_ (Achlcomponent) =
(_ (?_pportioned Component)
(_ O_Surrogate Component)
(_ (AchlSystem) = Aggregate (_ (AchlComponent) ) IAll Components
(AchlComponent) Distribution of achievability index (AchI) for a component.
(_) (AchlSystem) Distribution of AchI for a system.
_(Apportioned Component) Distribution of apportioned failure rates
required for component.
_(Surrogate Component) Distribution of likely failure rates for component
based on surrogate performance.
Achievability is measured in terms of an achievability index (Acid), which is measured
in terms of the measurable figure of merit for this study, random failure rate (_,), The
distribution of AcM for a component is the ratio of the distribution of failure rates
apportioned to the component based on design and mission requirement parameters, and
the distribution of failure rates associated with surrogates of the component from the
technology base. The distribution of Achl for the entixe NEP system is the aggregate of
component Achl distributions.
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SIMPLIFIED NEP ANALYSIS MODEL
The analysis process began with characterizing thesystem design at a high level in
terms appropriate to the analysis tools.
NP-TIM-92 927 NEP: System Com:cp_
BASIC NEP SYSTEM MODEL-- AS GIVEN
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We wereprovided a simplemodel of the NEP system,consistingof two essentially
independent modules. Each module consisted of a Primary Heat Sour¢_ Loop (R), an
Auxiliary Thermal Subsysmm (A) two Secondary Loops (S), two Power Management and
Distribution Assemblies (P), and two Thruster Assemblies ('I3.
This basic top level design representation was extended and altered somewhat to
provide various design concept bases for analysis.
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I I
NEP SYSTEM MODEL
Two 5MWe NEP Modules:
• Each 5MWe NEP module:
• 1 Primary heat source subsystem (R)
1 Auxiliary thermal management system (A)
• 2 Secondary subsystems (S)
2 Power Management And Distribution (PMAD)
subsystems (P)
• 4 half-Thruster module subsystems (T)
. The "given" thruster modules were split, as analysis
indicated two halves essentially independent.
No comment required.
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NEP SYSTEM MODEL-- AS ANALYZED
i sB1i IP,11
Itwas notedthateach Thrusterassemblyhad two essentiallyindependenthalves,so
themodel was modifiedslightlytomake thisapparent.
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I
SIMPLIFIED NEP ANALYSIS MODEL
I I
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The nextstepinthe analysis_occss wastoidcn_L_/andch_ _c measurable
successcri_riaforthemission.
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NEP MANNED MARS MISSION
SUCCESS CRITERIA
• 99% Probability of Crew Safety.
Aborts possible,
• System need not reach Mars, but
• Must return to Earth in or before nominal mission time
frame.
95% Probability of Mission Success.
• Criteria applied to NEP System Only!
Overall mission probabilities must account for all other
systems:
Life Support,
• GNC, EPS (distribution), Thermal,'IT&C, C&DH, etc.,
Ascent / Descent modules,
Earth Crew Capture Vehicle.
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At a top level, the success criteria was given as 99% probability of crew safety, and
95% probability of mission success. It should be noted that this criteria was interpreted to
apply only to the NEP system, not to other, equally vital, systems.
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SIMPLIFIED NEP ANALYSIS MODEL
The last aspect of the Problem Unique Inputs portion of the analysis problcm was to
idemfif'y and _fine the Mission Profdc.
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BASELINE MISSION CHARACTERISTICS
Mission Profile Orbit Plot
•Imelco -350 MT
• Minimum Helioccnmc
Distance-0.50 -Air
The mission analyzed was a 2014 conjunction class Manned Mars Mission.
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SIMPLIFIED NEP ANALYSIS MODEL
After obtaining and characterizing the Program Unique Inputs, the technology base
was then examined to determine the diagnostic tools appropriate to the analysis problem.
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DIAGNOSTIC TOOLS
Markappcr_-- Dynamic Markov Chain analysis program.
• Determine top-level reliability figure(s) of merit (FOM).
RAP2_TM)-- Reliablity Approtionment Program.
• Apportion top-level FOM to component level.
Dynapro<rM)-- Dynamic Integer Programming
. Non-linear "optimization" of redundancy complement.
CARP<rM) -- Computerized Aggregation of Reliability
Parameters.
• Combine historical reliability performance data from
multiple sources.
m
The analytical tools selected w_-_ MatkappTM, RAP2 TM, DynaproTM , and CARF TM.
MarkappTM is a dynamic Mart.or-Chain analysis program. This tool allows the system
to be modeled as a set of discrete start,s, based on the number and types of components
that will fail. The probability of the syslmn being in each of the slams at any lime in the
mission can be calculated based on the failm'e rates associated with the components. This
tool is used to delmardncwhat set(s) of top-level failure rates will result in achieving the
mission success criteria.
RAF2 TM apportions top-level reliability goals to lower-level components based on a
varLetyof apportionment strategies. Dynapro TM is a Dynamic Integer Programming tool
used in conjunction with RAP2 TM to de.mine optimum allocations of, and limits on.
spare allocation.
CARP TM -- ComputerizedAggregationof Reliability Pm-ax_ters is usedtocombineor
aggregatedistributionsoffailureatesfromcomponentssimilartoNEP componentsto
defineanappropriatesatrrogatedistributionf reachoftheNEP components.
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MARKAPP(TM) MARKOV CHAIN ANALYSIS
The Markov chain is a discrete state - continuous time
analytical model.
Used to determine sets of functional element failure rates
that meet success criteria•
A state is a unique configuration of NEP functional elements
2 Pri, 2 AuxTherm, 4 Sec, 4 PMAD, 8 Thruster
Transition between states i and j occurs at transition rate _,i_.
Markapp(TM) calculates probability that the system is in each
state -- a function of:
• Previous state of the system,
• Failure rates of functional elements,
Time in mission.
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The Markov model is comprised of a description of the NEP system in terms of its
functional elements, a list of operational states of the system in terms of whether each of
the components is operational or failed, and the rate at which the system transitions from
one state to another. The transition rates are expressed in terms of the failure rates of the
functional elements of the system.
Markapp TM solves the Markov model for the probabilities that the system is in each
defined operational state as a function of time in the mission. These probabilities can be
combined with the knowledge of which states meet the mission success criteria at each
phase of the mission to determine the probability of the system meeting the success
criteria. That information, in turn, indicates whether the input (trial) failure rates for the
functional components will meet the mission objectives.
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THE MARKOV PROCESS
x (t + At) x(t)
x(t) = [xi(t) ] = vector of probabilities that system is in state i.
N, aij, bij, cii, d_i, fii,: Parameters determined by the system design.
TheseequationsdescribethemathematicsoftheMarkov Process.
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RAP2( ) RELIABILITY APPORTIONMENT
RAP2(TM) apportions reliability from top-level to component
level.
Simplified apportionment
equation: __w
Zw
RiApportioned = RGoal
3 apportionment methods:
Simple -- based on history of like components:
WiSimple = RiSurrogate = e "_'is_ofm
AGREE -- based on part count (complexity) and criticality:
WiAgree= #Partsi * Criticalityi
Weighted Nth-Root -- based on physical characteristics of
component:
The RAF2 TM Reliability Apportionment Program is used to apportion the top-level
(functional-level) failure rates arrived at using the Markov analysis to the lower level
components of the NEP system. The program uses three algorithms, each of which
provide unique insight into the apportionment problem. The Simple apportionrnent
algorithm is based strictly on the historical performance of like components, and indicates
most directly how much the systmn reliability requirements will push the technology base.
The AGREE algorithm is based on subjective assessment of the component relative
importance, and on the component complexity. AGREE therefore provides a simple and
much less rigorous way of apportioning based on mission requirements (criticality) than
the Markov model. The weighted Nth Root method apportions reliability based on
subjective evaluation of the relative difficulty in achieving high reliability for the
components. Comparing relative differences between the Simple and Weighted Nth Root
algorithms provides a first approximation of what is available versus what the analyst
believes ought to be available.
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CARPcrM SURROGATE AGGREGATION
• Identify likely failure rate range of new component based on
aggregation of similar components:
• Similar in function;
• Similar in application;
• Similar in stress environment•
• Failure rate distribution incorporates:
• Inter- and Intra-source Variability;
Uncertainty in similarity of function, application, or
environment.
• Surrogate data sources:
• NPRD-91, DSR-4, IEEE 500, CREDO, various NUREGs.
• No similar historical surrogate => establish range by "reality
boundary".
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Finding the failure rates of components similar in function, application, and
environment to the NEP components involves searching multiple som'ces. From each
source a distribution of failure rates reflecting the variability in the historical components is
obtained. CARP combines a number of these sources into a single, surrogate distribulion
representative of the anticipated performance of similar components in the NEP system.
If sufficiently similar components cannot be found in historical data references, a
surrogate distribution for the NEP component is obtained by estimming the bounds within
which the failure rate must fall, based on the physics of the component and the comparison
of the unknown component with well-known components.
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SIMPLIFIED NEP ANALYSIS MODEL
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The selection and analysis of surrogates for NEP component performance was the next
step in the analysis of the technology base.
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READING SURROGATE DATA
Pdlmm/, Heal Scxm_ Loop
Reactor
Fuel and Cladding
Dd_n9 Slnpca_
Conl_ol Rods
sa0eWRod._mmt_y
Pin Sue_rt Structure
TempemnJm Sensorn
Post'dofl Semnor3
Level Seesor$
Note: Scale of Failure
Rate axis is logarithmic
• Failure rate
distributions
generally lognormal.
Eachbar showsthe
aggregme d_lributionof
failuremtea ot sun_jates
lot thenamed compormnt.
Failure Rate
For each component, the distribution of representative (surrogate) failure rates is
depicted as indicated. The upper and lower bounds of the indicated distributions are in fact
the 5th and 95th percentiles. The mean and me.xiian are both shown be.cause these
distributions are generally left-skewed rather than normal, so the mean and median are
different.
The x axis of this plot is logarithmic, so the distributions (which appear symmetric on
this graph) are in fact lognormaL
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ISurrogate failure rate dis_butions for components in the primary heat source loop.
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Surrogate failure rate disn'ibutions for components in t,hc Auxiliary Thermal
Management system..
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Surrogate failure rate distributions for components in the Secondary Loop system.
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Surrogau:failure rate disu'i_budonsfor componentsin the PowerManagementand
Disu'ibudonsystem.
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Surrogate failure rate dis_butions for components in the Thruster module.
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INTERPRETATION OF SURROGATE DATA
NARROW SURROGATE DISTRIBUTIONS:
Cause:
Little variability among components in class;
Little uncertainty in similarity between surrogate class and
NEP application.
• Generally mature, well understood component.
Implication:
• These components unlikely to change their nature through
evolutionary design or wishful thinking.
Candidate NEP components:
• Valves, Cables, Switchgear, Sensors, Regulators, ...
Required performance > attained performance?
• Fundamental redesign of function.
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Narrow distributions in thesurrogate data indicate that thecomponent exhibits little
variabilitynhistoricalapplieatiom,andthatthereislittleuncertaintyintheapplicationf
this surrogate to the NEP application.
A narrow distribution is generally indicative of a mature component whose essential
nature is well understood and generally not a good candidate for improvement in
reliability, except through very fundamental redesign.
INTERPRETATION OF SURROGATE DATA
BROAD SURROGATE DISTRIBUTIONS:
Causes:
• High variability in surrogate component population.
• Significant uncertainty in applicability of surrogate data to
NEP.
Implication:
Requires close attention in design, specification, and
selection.
High developmental risk.
Convexscly,wide dismbutionsofsurrogatefailu_ramsindica_significantvariability,
uncctu_ty,orboth.Wide distributionsindica_thatthiscomponentmay beahighrisk
imm.
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SIMPLIFIED NEP ANALYSIS MODEL
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In the problem definition phase of the analysis, the first step was to characterize the
design.
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NEP MARKOV MODELS - PHYSICAL CONFIGURATION
Three physical configurations of basic
model examined:
• No Cross-Connection
• Electrical Cross Connection w/in
5MWe module
• Electrical Cross Connection accross
5MWe modules
Therewerecsscntiallythreediffexemwaystofunctionallyconnect,or"wire"thebasic
designwc wcrcprovidedintheprograminputphase.Eachoftheconnectionsu'atcgics
cmbodicdadifferentlevelofinhc_ntresiliency.
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SIMPLIFIED NEP ANALYSIS MODEL
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The next step in problem definition was to dcfinc the requirement drivcrs within the
context of the model.
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QUANTIFY SUCCESS CRITERIA
Possible quantitative interpretations of success criteria:
Simple Reliability -
• Probability that NEP system performs to specified
capacity throughout mission > 0.99.
• Specified capacity = Full capacity
Mission success and crew safety equivalent.
• Probability of available thrust > minimum thrust required.
Minimum thrust required varies with mission phase.
Minimum thrust to complete mission generally not
equal to Minimum thrust for crew safety (abort).
. Expected value of thrust.
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At least three different interpretations could bc applied to the basic mission success
criteria. The interpretation applied in this study was to determine the minimum thrust
required in each phase of the mission for crew safety and for mission success, and to select
reliability parameters so that the probability of achieving those levels of thrust was greater
than 0.99 (crew safety) and 0.95 (mission success).
An important element of this interpretation is the idea that the thrust required to
complete the mission successfully is not necessarily equal to the thrust required to return
the crew safely.
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This graph depicts the probability that the NEP system will be able to deliver at least
the indicated fraction of full thrust (100%, 87.5%, 75% .... ) as a function of mission phase.
given the subsystem failure rates indicated in the upper fight comer. These failure rates
were chosen to produce an exemplary graph, not because the are realistic.
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THE AVAILABLE THRUST SUCCESS CRITERIA
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dominated by the 99%Crew Safety
objective.
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The preceding graph provided the probability that discrete levels of thrust would be
available during each mission phase, half of the information required to determine the
probability of meeting crew safety and mission success objectives. This curve show the
other haft of the informalSon required - specifically, what level of thrust is required in
each phase to complete the mission and to ensure crew safety.
While these values were selected with some care, they are not the result of rigorous
mission and orbit analysis. They are intended to represent a starting point for further
investigation. Note that the values selected imply that the thrust required to ensure crew
safety is the same as the thrust required for mission success throughout the return leg of
the mission. The implication of this, if it correctly reflects the actual system, is that for
most combinations of subsystem reliability parameters the 99% crew safety requirement
dominates the 95% mission success requirement.
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SELECTING RELIABILITY
FIGURE OF MERIT
• Manned mission phases occur after Earth escape spiral "shakedown".
• Infant mortality not an issue during manned phases.
• Sound design practice is assumed:
• Crew return before ageing becomes issue.
• Reliability Figure of Merit = Random Failure Rate.
The rate at which failures occur is referred to as the hazardrate. In general, hazard
:: _ a time-varying quantity and is f_uently separatedinto coml_.ts which reflect
the behavior of the hazard rate over time. These components are: (1) infant mortality, the
hazard rate starts high and decreases over time as latent defects are "shaken out" of the
new system; (2) random failure, the hazard rate is approximately constant; (3) aging,
hazard rate increases as components weaken; and (4) life-Limit,hazard rate increases
rapidly (to 1) for components with a deterministic, observable depletion mechanism.
The constant random failure rate was the only component of hazardrate analyzed in
this study based on the assumption that the manned portion of the NEP mission would
occur in that domain.
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SIMPLIFIED NEP ANALYSIS MODEL
I LO MISSION OPF..RAJ)IIXTY ANALYSIS )0 _ SPAC_ INSIGHT DEVELOPMF..NT
_ Scllnce ADJllcallonJ
Intorn|llodll Ccrllofltlon
M| Eagdewee,Ogoed ¢|mD|lf
The next phase in the analysis was to develop the inputs for the selected tools.
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DESIGN ALTERNATIVES TESTED
' Matrix of achievability
M..,,_ n_, analysis experiments.
87.5% I 75.0_ I 67.5% _0.0% Ec:It_,LIII ,_lv@ " Cellscontain:
I i
I 2 I MEL 4
" Experiment Number
5 5T
6T
Although the analysis was limited to a single core design conecpt, a wide variety of
perturbations or mtcrpretauons of the design could be applied. This matrix depicts the
alternatives that were analyzed.
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NEP MODEL I MARKOV STATE DIAGRAM
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The simplest analytical model of the system allowed no cross connection between
subsystems on different legs within a 5MWe module, or across modules. This diagram
depicts the system states used in the Ma_ov analysis for this model
State 0 depicts the system with aLlmodules operational. State 1 is the system with a
single failed thnmcr module, state 2 has two failed thrusters - one in each leg of the same
5MWe module. For this amlysis all conditions resulting in less than 50% of total thrust
available were lumped into the san_ state, since we assumed that all such states led to
mission failure and loss of the crew.
The rate at which this system (model) transitions from one state to another is indicated
in terms of the failure rates of the subsystems. U1Kmately, the Markov analysis is used to
find the sct subsystem failure rates that result in the success criteria being met. The thrust
levels associated with each system state arc also indicated on this diagram.
The other models are not depicted in this fashion because the number of sta=s was too
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SIMPLIFIED NEP ANALYSIS MODEL
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The finalst_pinimplcmcndng thisstudyapproachwas toanalyzethesubsystem
failurcratetradespacercsulfingfrom theMarkov analysis.
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Primary and Auxiliary Model Comparison
The Markov model associates sets of failure rates with the probabilities that the system
will be in each state at any time in the mission. Combining this with the knowledge of the
t_rust available in each state, and the thrust required for mission success and crew safety,
we can determine the probability that the system will meet the success criteria as a
function of the subsystem failure rates.
These graphs depict the "success probability" of the system as a function of the failure
rate of the Primary Loop and the Auxiliary Thermal subsystems versus the failure rates of
all other subsystems. Primary Loop and Auxiliary Thermal are lumped together because if
either fails, the system is reduced to 50% thrust capacity -- a failure in any mission phase.
This means that the Primary Loop and Auxiliary Thermal subsystems are equally
important to the system - from the success requirements point of view their failures are
indistinguishable -- therefore the successful failure rates associated with them are the
same. The different graphs depict different models which vary primarily in the arrangement
of interconnections. Note that the failure rates required for the Primary and Aux. Thermal
subsystems is essentially independent of the degree of interconnection, since any failure of
these systems results in mission failure.
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Secondary & PMAD Model Com
|
il,
the Primary and Aux. Thermal subsystems, the PMAD and Secondary subsystems
are of equal importance. Since a failure of either of these subsystems would reduce
available thrust to 75%, and since (for these models) the thrust required for crew safety
and mission success is 87.5% during the Mars escape spiral, any PMAD or Thruster
failure prior to Mars escape would result in mission failure and generally (given the model
assumptions) loss of the crew. The required failure rates for PMAD and Secondary given
these model assumpuons are therefore essentially the same as those required for the
Prima_ and Aux. Thermal subsystems, very high, and independent of degree of
interconnecfion. We will show in othermodels which assumptionsneedto berelaxed to
permitmorereasonablefailureratesforthese subsystems.
The Minimum Equipment Set model will be described later, but it should be noted here
that in that model the 95% mission success criteria generally dominates the 99% crew
safety requirement, so the set of "successful" failure rates in that model are those that
result in "Overall Success Probability of >95%, rather than 99% which is the case in the
other models.
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Thruster Model Comparison
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Thruster failures only r_mov¢ 12.5% of the fuLLthrust capacity, so a single failed
thruster results in a successful system state at any phase of the mission, and in most
phases, several Thrusgu"failures can occur and still resutt in mission success. Thrusters are
aLso very sensitive to the degree of interconncction between components.
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Model 4 Primary and Auxiliary Thermal
In Model 4 some deg_,e of repaiz or salvage is allowed in systems other than the
Primary, specifically, 25% of dtefirst failures that occurin thosesubsysu:msarc assumed
to be repairable, and all the second failures are repairable, since one of the two failed
systems could be used to salvage the other. The diffm_nt models depicted here show the
impact of lowering the highest minimum thrust requi_ment from 87.5% (Model 4) to
50% (Model 4'I"3) in 12.5% increments.
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The benefit of reducing the minimum thrust requirement to thresholds which allow the
failure of a subsystem without causing system failure axe evident in these graphs. When the
required thrust is reduced from 87.5% to 75% the rv.quix_ failure rates for Secondary and
PMAD subsystems are reduced by an order of magnitude. Further reduction to 67.5%
results in no change since Secondary and PMAD failures reduce available thrust m 25%
increments. Reducing the required thrust to 50% gains another order of magnitude in
required failure ram.
NP-TIM-92 965 NEP: Sy.tnta CoaeepU
il
!
L_ the Secondary and PMAD, requited Thrustor failure rams are significantly
reduced as the max_um required thrust is reduced. Since Thrustor failures only remove
12.5% of the total thrust capacity, each 12.5% reduction in required thrust has an
associated relaxation of Thnmmr failure ram requireraents.
Physically the effect of reducing the maximum required thrust in tl_ model can be
achieved without increasing tho total power of the system. The reduction of thrust
requirements corresponds to designing the Secondary, PMAD, and Thrusters so that they
can operat_ at higher nominal loads. For example, ff the Secondary and PMAD were
designed to operat_ at 150% of nominal capacity, haft of the failure impact of a unit could
be absorbed by the other unit in the 5MWe module. Instead of reducing the thrust capacity
of the system by 25%, the failure of a Secondary or PMAD would only reduce the
capacity by 12.5%. Similar gain is achieved by designing the Thruster module to operate
at 125% of nominal capacity. This effect is enhanced by maximizing the cross-connectivity
between subsystems.
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SIMPLIFIED NEP ANALYSIS MODEL
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To complete the analysis the setsof subsystem-level fa.ilurcrates which me_t the
success criteria are apportioned down to the component level for comparison with
surrogate data. The RAP2 TM computer code is used to accomplish this apportionment.
OnlytwooftheRAP2 TM apportionn_ntalgorithms(theSimplealgorithmand the
WeightedNthRoot"algorithm)wereappliedinthisanalysistoestablisht eboundswithin
whichcomponentfailureateswouldneedtolieinorderforthesystemtoachievethe
successcriteria.The Simplealgorithmestablishestheworstcasebound,andtheWeighted
Nth Rootmethod,thebestcase.
A completeanalysiswouldextendthematerialpresentedhereintworespects.First,
an "optimum"setofcomponentfailurerateswouldbcsoughtbyseekingthcsetof
requirementdrivensubsystemlevelfailurerateswhichminimizetheaggregate
achievabilityndex(Achl).Thiswouldrequirextensiveiterationwhichwas notpossible
inthisanalysis.SccondadistributionofapportionedfailurerateandAchlwouldbc
developed, rather than the mean values presented here. The apportioned failure rates
presented here are a solution, but by no means the best solution, to the problem.
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Thisgraphicdepicts th_ apportioned failure ram values for the Primary Loop
subsysmm along side the surrogam distributions obtained fi'om the historical performance
of similar components. The achicvabilit7 in_x (Acid) is rcprescat_l by the distance
betw_n the surrogam disu'ibutioas and the apporuonod values. The point cs_nam of
AchI for this model in the upper right corner is the ratio of the Simple rr_hod apportioned
values to the mean of the surrogat_ distributions. This value is esscndaUy an outer bound
on the achievability of the sysmm for Model 1.
Model 1 was the simplest configuration analyzed, with no _sillcncy through
subsysmm cross-conn_don, and using the worst case (87.5%) required thrust criteria.
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This graphic depicts the achievability of the Secondary system for Model 1. The
distance between the Simple apportionment values and the surrogate distributions (the
mean values of the surrogate distributions) is the same as it was for the Primary Loop
subsystem. This will be true of all components because of the nattnc of the Simple
algorithm. The Weighted Nth Root apportioned values arc farther from the surrogates.
This is a result of selecting a priori weighting values which indicated that, in general, high
reliability would be more difficult to achieve in the Primary subsystem than in the
Secondary.
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Note thatthe heatexchangersand the sensorsinthe AuxiliaryThermal sys=m have
significantlyhighersurrogam£ailus¢ra=s thanisrequired.Also,thesensorshave fairly
tightdistributions,indicatingthatthesea_ probablyfairlymamm components withlittle
varianceoruncertaintyinapplicability.Th_s¢ factorsindicatethatthesecomponents
shouldreceivespecialattention.Thisisparticularlyml¢ ofthesensors,which arefound in
everysubsystem.Sensorsarediscussedinmore dcmillater.
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Sensors, particularly the position sensors, appear to be the limiting PMAD component.
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The Thruster Feed System, sensors, filters and regnlators are the limiting Thruster
components.
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Thisdiagramdepictstheapportionmentresultsu ingamodelwhichreflectsa
"Minimum EquipmentList"approachtocrewsafc_y.Inthismodel,itwas assumedthat
thedecisiontoabortwouldbecontinuouslyanalyzedbasedon theoperabilityofa
Minimum EquipmentListfortheNEP system.Inthisapproach,ffthesystemdoesnot
havesufficientopcra_angcquiprncntatthestartofaphasetocomplelcthemissionwitha
99% probabilityofcrewsafety,thenanabortwouldoccur.The setofequipmentrequired
to ensure crew safety varies from phase to phase, and is referred to as the Minimum
Equipment List.
Applying this standard allows "restarting" the reliability clock with respect to crew
safety at the start of each phase. The mission success reliability clock continues to run, so
the 95% mission success criteria generally dominates the 99% crew safety criteria in this
model.
Note that this approach improves the achievability index by a factor of aknost 20 -
from 4.7 * 10-5 to 2.9 * 10"4.
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Model 4(discussedpreviously)allowedlimitedrepair/salvage.Nou_thatthe
achicvabilityndexisapproximatelyafactorof10bet_rthanthebasecase(mod_lI).
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This model allowed cross-connection of the subsystem elcrncnts within a 5MWe
module. This approach affords lift.It improvement in achicvability for thcsc modeLs
be,cause of the high importance of the subsystem modules. Any failure other than a
Thruster resulted in the system producing less thrust than was required for the Mars
escape spiral (87.5%). Therefore, no amount of inl_xconnectivity compensates for a
subsystem failure.
Limited cross-connection examined in this model is expected to provide significant
benefit if the importance of the subsystems is lowcred, either by requiring a smaller
minimum thrust, or by providing excess capacity in the components as discussed
previously.
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This model, which allows for cross-connection of all elccmc_ components - even
across 5MWe modules -- suffers from the same problem that the more lJmimt cross-
connection model does. The minimum thnm requirement is set too high to allow the
(6.2 * 10"5 versus 5.1 * 10-_) is due to the fact that the _rusu_rs are operating m a s_x out
of eight redundancy configuration for th_ portion of the mission requiring 75% thrust or
less for c_w safety.
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ACHIEVABILITY OF NEP DESIGN
Achievability is related to distance between apportionment
curves and surrogate distributions.
Simple and NthRoot Methods provide very different results:
NthRoot apportions to function
Simple apportions to individual component
Where a function has many identical components, Simple
lies farther from surrogate.
Actual solution lies between curves.
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To recap, the achievability index is the rneasttr¢ of the distance between what is
required of the system, and what is demonstrably attainable. The surrogate date indicates
what is attainable, and failure rams apportioned from top-level reliability requirerr_nts
establish what is required. The two apportionment methods used here were selected to
bound (at least to first order) the failure rates that would actually be required for the NEP
system components.
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DESIGN ALTERNATIVES
ACHIEVABILITY MATRIX
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Matrix of achievability
analysis experiments.
Cells contain:
• Experiment Number
Central Value of
Simple method
achievability index.
• Equivalent reliability
for a static system.
This matrix shows again the different models that were compared, along with the
associamdachicvabi.li_index (Achl), andthe cquivalcmstaticreliability valuewhich
would_sult if _h_apportionedfailm'¢ratesfor that modelwere usedin a static reliability
modelof the NEP systcrn.
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ADDING RELIABILITY
THROUGH REDUNDANCY
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"Optimal" failure rate versus mass of redundancy for Primary
Loop Instruments found using Dynaprocm).
Note that there is a limit to the reliability that can be added
through redundancy.
Typical levels of redundancy improve functional failure rate by
factor of 2.
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A common fallacy is that any level of reliability can be achieved by adding enough
redundancy. To determine the extent to which this true we used Bellman's dynamic inl_ger
programming algorithm as implemented in Dynapro TM to find the mathematical "optimum"
redundant combinations of sensors in the Primary Loop. Here "opl£mum" is the highest
reliability that can be obtained in a "M out of N" configuration for a specified increase in
mass. We added up to 50 kg of mass for redundancy, almost an order of magnitude more
than the mass of the single-string sensor suite, and checked the reliability for the
"optimum" cembination of sensors at that mass increment.
The curve illustrates that, while a very significant improvement in reliability -
orders of magnitude -- can be obtained, there is a limit. Moreover, the mass penalty for
improving reliability solely through redundancy is excessive.
Typically, double or triple redundant systems improve functional failure rate by a
factor of two.
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Finally we cxaminc the various models to det, rtmm what lessons were learned from
this analysis.
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DESIGN INSIGHTS
Design for Salvage / Repair is the single best strategy to
maximize Probability of Crew Safety, Mission Success.
Design & plan for refurbishment prior to Mars transfer orbit.
Design to maximize robustness:
Maximize element interconnection.
• Size system so return is possible with major element failure
-- keep element importance < mission threatening.
Design to remain operating after major failures
--"Post-Thresher" approach to system safety.
Use Minimum Equipment List approach to mission and abort
planning.
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The first order conclusions of this study are fairly simple. (1) _ a manned environment
where there is a need for the system to operate near its capacity at very high reliability
even late in the mission, no single reliability strategy is more effective than designing the
system to allow for salvage and repair. (2) Since radiological concerns will probably
preclude full scale operation of the system and "bum in" prior to launch, infant mortality
will be a factor. (3) Within the basic design parameters specified there are a number of
ways to combine the system components to maximize the robustness of the system. (4)
The Minimum Equipment List approach to mission and abort design can be used to
prevent the very stringent requirement for probability of crew safety from setting
unrealistic reliability goals.
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DESIGN FOR SALVAGE / REPAIR
Ability to salvage / repair improves achievability by an order of
magnitude or more.
Keys to salvage are:
Modular, repairable design;
Element importance < mission threatening.
Parts on hand governed by:
Element importance;
Failure probability -- Pareto rule;
• Commonality.
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Designing the system for salvage and repair does not mean that the crew should be
able or required to rcplaoe any failed part in the system. R does mean that, as a last resort,
the crew should be able to replace critical, highly stressextparts, and should be able to
change connections or move modules to jury rig a single working element from two or
more that have failed.
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PLAN FOR REFURBISHMENT
Infant mortality failures wil___[occur during Earth escape spiral
"shakedown".
Take advantage of the shakedown opportunity, rather than
be victimized by it.
• Infant mortality is excellent predictor of random failure
performance.
• 1st month failure rate = 4 to 20 times random
(mean = 7 * Random failure rate)
Distribution of failures among subsystems /
component type approximately constant.
Factor in time for minor redesign and on-orbit
refurbishment prior to heliocentric transfer.
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Early failures attributed to infant mortality have played a role in neatly every space
system. Since the manned portion of the NEP Mats mission does not begin until after the
NEP system has accumulalr.d significant operational time, it is highly probable that some
failures will have occurred before the crew boards. By designing and planning for minor
refurbishment prior to the sm't of the manned portion of the mission, NEP planners can
minimize the possibility that the crew will start the mission with less than a full redundancy
complement. Moreover, since infant failures arc prexiictors of the types of failures which
will occur during the operational phase, the unmanned "shakedown cruise" can actually be
used to significantly enhance the probability of mission success - through procexiurc
development, work-around strategies, and possibly even minor component redesign -
prior to the actual start of the mission.
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MAXIMIZE ROBUSTNESS
Element interconnection
Reduce / remove probability that element failure will
prevent use of other elements in string.
Element importance -- impact of element failure on system.
Size system elements so major element failure does not
jeopardize crew return.
"Post-Thresher" approach to safety -- System response to
component failure determined solely by maximizing
probability of returning the crew alive.
"Safeing system" generally = leave it alone / operating.
e.g.: Reactor may continue operation w/open control loop
(no instrumentation) -- but restart w/out instrumentation
difficult or impossible => no shutdown (SCRAM) on
I instrument/control failure. _ _,,,.,,,,,,,°,
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Maximizing therobustnessofthcNEP systeminvolvesthreeelements.F'u-st,minimize
theextenttowhich thefailureofone elementm a stringimpactsthcotherelementsinthe
string.Second,maximize theextenttowhich an operalingelementcan compensateforthe
lossofa likeelement.Third,cusurethatno elementinthesysmm ismade more important
tothesystemthanisabsolutelyrequired.Forexample,an irrecoverablefailureinthe
Primaryinsmm_ntation which resultsintheshutdown (SCRAM) ofthereactorwould
resultinthelossofthecrew inmost missionphases.Almost any levelofriskassociated
withcontinuingtooperatethcreactor,despitethefailureofacriticalsensor,ispreferable
tothatalternative.
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MINIMUM EQUIPMENT LIST
Minimum Equipment List (MEL) -- the minimum set of
equipment required to complete mission.
Varies with time in mission.
Points where MEL changes are abort decision points.
• Determined by Markov or other dynamic analysis:
• MEL state = minimum state vector that
accomplishes success criteria?
Actual system state < MEL state => abort.
In general, changes limiting reliability criteria from 99%
P(c=wsa_w)to 95% P(Mission Success).
Improves achievability by factor of 5 or more.
May have other mission planning benefits -- staging, etc.
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Applying the Minimum Equipment List approach to the mission and system design will
enhance crew safety while limiting the burden of very high system reliability goals
associated with crew safety.
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IMPACT OF DESIGN INSIGHTS
O N ACHIEVAB ILITY
Baseline (No Cross Connection)
Redundancy (*2)
Salvage /Repair (*10)
AchlSimple
4.7.10 5
• 9.5.10 .5
5.1.10 -4
Element Importance < Mission Threatening
(Primary and Auxiliary Thermal not included)
6.8.10 .5
Remain Operating After Failure
(No instruments, sensors in critical failure path)
• 2.4.10 -4
Minimum Equipment Set ('5.1)
2.9,10 -4
Cummulative
4.7.10 .5
9.5,10 -5
9.5,10-4
1.5.10 .3
7.5.10 .3
3.8,10 "2
The design insights gained from analyzing the different models (design concepts) are
generally not correlated, so to a significant degree their effect (if applied) is cumulative.
This table shows that, taken together, the reliability enhancing design alternatives analyzed
here improve the outer boundary of overall achievability for the NEP system by three
orders of magnitude. Since the range of achievability index spans at least two orders of
magnitude, the final AchI value of 4 * 10-3 is within the range of achievable using current
technology.
This conclusion does not imply that meeting the quantitative operational reliability
goals for this system will be easy, or that new technologies should not be examined for
potential reliability improvements. On the contrary, several critical functions, notably heat
exchangers / radiators, and sensors should be examined carefully to determine if there is an
intrinsically more reliable way to accomplish the function than using existing technology.
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SUMMARY
The process and conclusions of this study have been discussed at some length. This
study deliberal_ly only examined the boundaries of the problem and the conclusions should
be considered more qualitative (with extensive quantitative backup) than quantitative. We
did not atmmpt, for example, to find optimal or neat optimal component failure rate
requirements. To do so would require retrmement and extensive recursion of the models
and tools we have demonstrated.
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CONCLUSIONS
CONCEPT OF ACHIEVABILITY:
Quantifies how far a design has to go with respect to success
criteria.
• A powerful method for
assessing design alternatives;
• assessing developmental risk;
• directing R&D effort.
The concept of aehievability was used in this study to measure the distance between
the required and the attainable. This concept proved m be very powerful and is
recomn_nded for use in quantitative analyses of any perfcmnance dimension which pushes
the state of the art.
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CONCLUSIONS
DESIGN ALTERNATIVES:
Several promissing design strategy alternatives were analyzed.
• Repair / Salvage.
• Maximizing Robustness:
• Cross-Connection
Reducing element importance < mission threatening.
This study examined only a few design alternatives within a fairly rigid basic design
envelope. While several promising reliability-enhancing strategies were identified and
examined, there is clearly more that could be done.
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CONCLUSIONS
DESIGN ACHIEVABILITY:
Overall achievability for simple, no cross-connection design is
very low - 10-4 even with redundancy factored in.
However, simple design alternatives presented here give a
cummulative 3 order of magnitude increase in achievabiliity.
While challenging, NEP achievability is within striking
distance of realization.
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It is the conclusion of this study that the existing technology base could support the
quantitative reliability requimmonts of a mannexl Mars mission.
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NUCLEAR ELECTRIC PROPULSION
TECHNOLOGY
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